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TORT DUTIES OF LANDOWNERS: A POSITIVE
THEORY
Keith N. Hylton *

INTRODUCTION

One of the most controversial areas of modern tort law is that of
the duty of landowners toward people who visit their land. The
common law divided land visitors into three types: invitees,
licensees, and trespassers.! The highest duty of care was owed to
the invitee and the lowest to the trespasser. These distinctions led
courts to hand down harsh decisions and to draw formal lines
between the categories, which seemed to defy common sense at
times.
That traditional common-law approach was famously rejected
by the California Supreme Court in 1968, in Rowland v. Christian.'
The 1960s were a period of intellectual upheaval across society, and
so it makes sense in retrospect that a sturdy common-law tradition,
such as the classification of landowner duties, would be overturned
by California justices during that time. The court suggested that
the landowner duties were due to "historical considerations
stemming from the high place which land has traditionally held in
English and American thought, the dominance and prestige of the
landowning class in England during the formative period of the
rules governing the possessor's liability, and the heritage of
feudalism.
In other words, there was nothing to those duties other than the
dead hand of landed interests in pre-industrial England. Obviously,
with so much being rethought in the 1960s, it was time to discard

* Honorable Paul J. Liacos Professor of Law, Boston University,
knhylton@bu.edu. I thank Haoqing Zhang for research assistance.
1.

See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS

§§

333, 342-343 (1965).

On the

origin of the common-law distinctions, see, for example, Graham Hughes,
Duties to Trespassers:A ComparativeSurvey and Revaluation, 68 YALE L.J. 633
(1959); Fleming James, Jr., Tort Liability of Occupiers of Land: Duties Owed to
Licensees and Invitees, 63 YALE L.J. 605 (1954); Norman S. Marsh, The History
and Comparative Law of Invitees, Licensees and Trespassers, 69 LAW Q. REV.
182 (1953).
2. Rowland v. Christian, 443 P.2d 561 (Cal. 1968).
3. Id. at 564-65.
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the common-law landowner rules.4
In their place the court
substituted a general duty of reasonable care,5 which it regarded as
a return to a fundamental principle that had been distorted by classbased influence.
Rowland touched off a wave of rejections of the landowner
duties by other state courts. At this time, twenty-five jurisdictions
have modified the traditional common-law duties, based in part on
the reasoning of Rowland.6 The current draft of the Restatement
(Third) of Torts casts the same skeptical eye toward the commonlaw duties of landowners. 7
I have no objections to skepticism as a stock approach to legal
theories. However, there is a difference between skepticism and
beneficial reform. It is often much easier to find potential flaws in
any set of legal rules than to devise a superior system. Somewhere
between skepticism and reform proposals should come an effort to
understand precisely the function served by any set of legal rules
that appears questionable at first glance.
This Article undertakes a task that should have preceded the
Rowland decision: to understand the incentive-based function of the
classical landowner duties. I will argue that the classical duties
served useful regulatory functions. 8 The most important was
regulating the overall scale of injuries by imposing the risk of latent
defective conditions in property on the landowner when he was the
party most likely to be informed of the defects or to inform himself of
their existence.9 Overall, the duties shifted the risk from defective
4. On the general connection between the 1960s and reform of the
common law, see Gary T. Schwartz, The Beginning and the Possible End of the
Rise of Modern American Tort Law, 26 GA. L. REV. 601 (1992).

5. Id. at 659-60. Other jurisdictions have followed. See, e.g., Scurti v.
City of N.Y., 354 N.E.2d 794, 798 (N.Y. 1976); Basso v. Miller, 352 N.E.2d 868,
872-73 (N.Y. 1976). In Basso, the New York Court of Appeals abolished the
common-law distinctions regarding entrant status and replaced them with a
unitary duty-of-care standard. Basso, 352 N.E.2d at 872-73. Scurti further
specified that the common-law categorization would not be determinative of
landowner liability and listed three factors from the traditional analysis that
would continually be used in assessing the reasonableness issue: whether the
injury occurred on the defendant's property, whether the plaintiff entered the
land with the defendant's permission, and the plaintiffs age. Scurti, 354
N.E.2d at 798.
6. See Mallet v. Pickens, 522 S.E.2d 436, 444-45 (W. Va. 1999). Of the
twenty-five that have modified the law, seventeen have abolished the
distinction between invitees and licensees, and eight have extended the
uniform-care rule to trespassers as well.
7.

RESTATEMENT

(THIRD)

OF TORTS:

LiAB.

FOR PHYSICAL

HARM

§ 51

(Tentative Draft No. 6, 2009).
8. This Article builds on the arguments in Keith N. Hylton, Duty in Tort
Law: An Economic Approach, 75 FoRDHAM L. REV. 1501 (2006) [hereinafter
Hylton, Duty in Tort Law], and Keith N. Hylton, A Missing Markets Theory of

Tort Law, 90 Nw. U. L. REV. 977 (1996).
9. This argument applies especially to the distinction between invitees
and licensees, which is the most controversial of the distinctions.
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conditions toward the cheapest cost avoider. "
I. TRADITIONAL LANDOWNER DUTIES
common law divided the visitors to land into three

Thi
categories: invitee, licensee, and trespasser. in a ieading case,
Robert Addie & Sons (Collieries), Ltd. v. Dumbreck," the House of
Lords described the duties allocated to these categories as follows:
The highest duty exists towards those persons who fall into
the first category, and who are present by the invitation of the
occupier. Towards such persons the occupier has the duty of
taking reasonable care that the premises are safe.
In the case of persons who are not there by invitation, but who
are there by leave and license, express or implied, the duty is
much less stringent-the occupier has no duty to ensure that
the premises are safe, but he is bound not to create a trap or to
allow a concealed danger to exist upon the said premises,
which is not apparent to the visitor, but which is known-or
ought to be known-to the occupier.
Towards the trespasser the occupier has no duty to take
reasonable care for his protection or even to protect him from
concealed danger. The trespasser comes on to the premises at
his own risk. An occupier is in such a case liable only where
the injury is due to some willful act involving something more
than the absence of reasonable care. There must be some act
done with the deliberate intention of doing harm to the
trespasser, or at least some act done with reckless disregard of
the presence of the trespasser.12
A.

Duties

Consider the first two categories, invitee and licensee. With
respect to both the landowner has a duty of care to avoid injuries
due to defective conditions of which he is aware. If the landowner,
therefore, is aware of a step on a staircase that might give way
under pressure, he has a duty at least to inform an invitee or a
licensee about the dangerous step. Of course, the duty of reasonable
care is potentially broader than a duty to inform. The landowner
may be able to meet his duty of care by informing the visitor.
However, if merely informing the visitor is not enough to meet the
duty of care, the landowner may have to fix the dangerous step so
10. I thank Ariel Porat for suggesting the cheapest-cost-avoider label as a
concise, intuitive summary of my argument.
11. Robert Addie & Sons (Collieries), Ltd. v. Dumbreck, [1929] A.C. 358
(H.L.) (appeal taken from Scot.) (U.K.).
12. Id. at 364-65.
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that it will not give way under the weight of the visitor.
The amount of care required is determined by the
reasonableness test of tort law. Judge Learned Hand described the
reasonableness test as based on a balance between the expected loss
that could be avoided through care and the burden of taking care.' 3
The expected loss is just the probability of loss multiplied by the
severity or amount of the loss to the victim. Suppose, then, that if
the landowner does nothing to warn or fix the defective step, the
likelihood of injury to the visitor is 75%. Suppose also that the
amount of the loss to the visitor is at most $100 (in terms of medical
bills and lost wages) because the likelihood of a serious injury is
extremely low. Suppose that if the landowner warns the visitor, the
likelihood of injury falls to 50%. Suppose that if the landowner fixes
the step, the likelihood of injury falls to 0%.
The reasonableness of the landowner's conduct, in this example,
will be determined by comparing the expected losses avoided and
the burden of the specific care action chosen. The expected loss
avoided by a warning is $75 - $50 = $25. Since the cost of issuing a
warning to the visitor is likely to be much less than $25, the
landowner will have failed to exercise reasonable care if he does not
warn the visitor (either invitee or licensee) of the defective condition
of the staircase. Should the landowner fix the staircase (rather than
warn)? The expected loss avoided by fixing the staircase is $75.
Suppose the burden of fixing the stairwell is $5000. In this case, a
court probably would
hold that the landowner did not have a duty to
4
fix the stairwell.
Now consider a slightly different view of the same problem.
Suppose, instead, that the cost of fixing the staircase is $5000 and
that the injury that would be suffered as a result of the defective
step is $100,000. Under these assumptions, the expected loss
avoided by a warning would be $25,000. The expected loss avoided
by fixing the staircase would be $75,000. At the least, the
landowner would be expected to warn. But even after a warning,
the expected loss to the visitor would remain at $50,000. Given that
the cost of fixing the stairwell is $5000, a court might find that the
landowner had a duty to fix the stairwell. In other words, the
warning may be considered insufficient to meet the landowner's
duty of care to the visitor.
So far I have considered defective conditions to which the
13. United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947).

14. Admittedly, this gets us into the business of comparing physical
injuries to financial burdens, which is a rich topic. On some of the general
issues, see Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability

Rules and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARv. L. REV. 1089,
1111-15 (1972); Margaret Jane Radin, Compensation and Commensurability,
43 DuKE L.J. 56 (1993). For now, I will simply assume that the cost of fixing the

staircase is so large, relative to the expected injury avoided, that a court would
deem it reasonable not to have fixed the staircase.
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landowner owes an equivalent duty to both the invitee and the
licensee-because of his awareness of the condition. Now I will
consider the important difference between the two types of visitors.
Suppose the defective-stairwell condition is in an area of the house
that the landowner seldom visits (for example, the attic) and the
landowner is unaware of its existence. In this case, the traditional
common-law classifications imply that the landowner has a duty of
reasonable care with respect to the invitee but not the licensee.
In terms of the stairwell example, this means that the
landowner will not be held liable to the licensee visitor because he
was not aware of the condition. The landowner will have a duty
with respect to the invitee. The landowner has a duty of reasonable
care, which means a duty to take reasonable care in inspecting for
and reducing the likelihood of injury from the defective condition. If
the cost of inspecting and informing the invitee is likely to be far
less than the expected loss avoided, the landowner will be found
negligent in failing to inform the invitee. If the cost of fixing the
stairwell is high, the court may or may not find that a warning is
sufficient to meet his duty of care, depending on the severity of the
loss.
The key difference between the duty owed to the invitee and
that owed to the licensee is that the landowner has a duty of both
reasonable inspection and reasonable remedial conduct (warning the
visitor or fixing the defective condition) in the case of the invitee. In
the case of the licensee, the landowner has no duty to make a
reasonable inspection for defective conditions of which he is not
aware.
Consider the trespasser. According to Addie & Sons, the
landowner owes no duty of care to the trespasser, just a duty not to
intentionally harm him. Obviously this means that the landowner
will be held liable to the trespasser if he shoots the trespasser for no
reason other than to injure him. The landowner may also be liable if
he sets a trap for the trespasser. Thus, a landowner who sets out a
lion's pit into which a trespasser could fall will be held liable.
Perhaps a landowner may be held liable for holding a vicious animal
in a manner that a trespasser could not possibly observe until it is
too late. But as we consider other possible dangers, the outcome of a
trespasser lawsuit becomes less clear. The general norms are
clear-no intentional harms, no traps-but their application
remains a matter of discretion and dependent on the facts.
B.

Categories
It is easier to specify the duties owed to visitors under the
different visitor categories than to identify the boundaries of the
categories. Addie & Sons tells us that the invitee is someone who
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shares a joint interest with the landowner.15 Other sources say that
the landowner and invitee must have a mutual interest in their
transaction.16 The clear case is that of a business relationship that
brings the visitor to the land. The typical invitee is someone who
has a contract with the landowner, like a repairman who is visiting
to repair something on the occupier's land.
The licensee has come to be understood as a social guest rather
than someone in a business relationship with the landowner. A
neighbor or friend who drops by for a social visit is a typical
example. There is no contract between the parties. But the visit
may be part of an ongoing exchange between the two. Indeed, even
a neighbor who drops by for a social visit may be expecting a
reciprocal act in the future. This is a form of exchange, without
money changing hands.
Plenty of cases have arisen in which it is not clear whether the
visitor should be called an invitee or licensee. Suppose the visitor is
a friend who visits in order to help the landowner with a repair
project at the home. There is no contract between the parties, but
there is clearly a financial interest. The friend is performing a
service that has an identifiable market value. Moreover, he may be
doing the service in the expectation that the landowner will
reciprocate some time in the future. This transaction is arguably no
different in economic terms from the standard invitee relationship.
Instead of a transaction for money, it is a transaction with an
expectation of reciprocity in the future.
The cases do not tell us precisely whether to call such a visitor a
licensee or invitee. The only way to get an answer is to delve deeper
into the functional justification for the categories to see if there is a
basis for distinguishing these cases.
II. THE ECONOMICS OF LAND-VISITOR CATEGORIES IN THE COMMON

LAW
In this Part I will present economic explanations for the
common-law classifications of landowner duties. I will not attempt
to provide a single, simple theory that explains all of the doctrinal
rules. The landowner duties probably serve several functions.
I will focus on the different treatment of invitees and licensees.
That is the most controversial of the land-visitor distinctions. The
less favorable treatment of trespassers has been far less
15. Addie & Sons, [1929] A.C. at 371.
16. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 332 (1965) ("An invitee is
either a public invitee or a business visitor .... A business visitor is a person
who is invited to enter or remain on land for a purpose directly or indirectly
connected with business dealings with the possessor of the land."); Clem v.
United States, 601 F. Supp. 835, 841-42 (N.D. Ind. 1985); Mazzacco v. Purcell,
303 N.C. 493, 497, 279 S.E.2d 583, 587 (1981), abrogated by Nelson v. Freeland,
349 N.C. 615, 507 S.E.2d 882 (1998).
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controversial. Of the states that have reformed their landownerduty rules, all of them have abolished the distinction between
Only eight of them have abolished the
invitee and licensee.
distinction between trespasser and licensee. 17
Assumption of Risk and InformationalAsymmetry
One reason for the common-law distinction between the duties
owed to invitees and to licensees can be found in traditional
assumption-of-risk theory. 18 Invitees, as a class, are business
visitors who have no knowledge of the condition of the landowner's
property and no basis on which they might be able to predict the
condition.
Consider the repairman who visits the landowner's property to
fix an appliance. If the repairman assumes that the landowner's
property will not be defective, he will not consider the cost of injury
from defective conditions as part of his cost of service to the
landowner. The supply of his services, the set of reservation prices
that the repairman will set for visits, will be distorted from the fullinformation case because of his lack of knowledge.
The "repairman problem" can be described in the familiar
Let the supply
supply-and-demand framework of economics.
schedule labeled S in Figure 1 (below) represent the relationship
between the reservation prices of repairmen and the quantity of
service provided. The schedule builds in the typical assumptions of
economics: as the price offered to repairmen increases, more of them
will offer their services and less repair service will be demanded.
Let the demand schedule labeled D in Figure 1 represent the
relationship between price and the quantity of landowner-site repair
service demanded by landowners.
Assume the supply and demand schedules (S and D) in Figure 1
reflect the baseline scenario in which the property of landowners is
free from latent defective conditions. If there is a latent defective
condition, it will introduce a cost that is not contemplated by either
the landowner or the repairman. Let the expected cost of injury to
the repairman be $1. The cost can be introduced into the market
framework by adding it to the supply schedule. The injury cost is
part of the cost of supplying home repair service. For this reason, I
will treat it as a cost of service that, in a full-information market,
would induce the repairman to demand higher prices in order to
A.

17. Mallet v. Pickens, 522 S.E.2d 436, 444-45 (W. Va. 1999).
18. One of the early and theoretically sophisticated presentations of the
assumption-of-risk doctrine was provided by Chief Justice Shaw in Farwell v.
Boston & Worcester Railroad Corp., 45 Mass. (4 Met.) 49 (1842). On the
literature on assumption of risk, see Francis H. Bohlen, Voluntary Assumption
of Risk, 20 HARv. L. REV. 14 (1906); Fleming James, Jr., Assumption of Risk, 61
YALE L.J. 141 (1952); Kenneth W. Simons, Reflections on Assumption of Risk, 50
UCLA L. REV. 481 (2002).
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compensate for the risk of injury. In Figure 1 I have added an
alternative supply schedule (S), which represents the fullinformation case in which the repairman knows the precise risk of
injury from defective conditions on the property of landowners.
FIGURE 1: SUPPLY AND DEMAND FOR REPAIR SERVICES
LANDOWNER'S PROPERTY

ON

P
S.

$SI

--If

B
A
I
Is

C

D*
q

D
q

The economically optimal (or efficient) scale of consumption of
the services of repairmen is the level that reflects all of the costs and
benefits of the service. That is the level of service associated with
point B in Figure 1. However, if the repairman is not aware of the
risk of injury, and if the landowner is not held liable for the latent
defective condition, the level of service that will be generated by the
market is that associated with point A. This is a familiar result
from the literature on products liability: in the absence of full
information, the market tends to generate too much consumption of
a risky product.19 In this scenario, one observes that in the absence
of full information, the market for home repair services generates
19. See A.

MITCHELL POLINSKY, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND ECONOMICS

97-106 (2d ed. 1989) (discussing consumer and producer decisions concerning
product liability); James M. Buchanan, In Defense of Caveat Emptor, 38 U. CHI.
L. REV. 64 (1970) (challenging the shift towards strict products liability because
of its economic effects); A. Mitchell Polinsky & William P. Rogerson, Products
Liability, Consumer Misperceptions, and Market Power, 14 BELL J. ECON. 581
(1983) (analyzing market structure and its impact on the appropriate standard
of tort liability).
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too much service relative to the economically ideal level. The
socially excessive service level leads to a socially excessive rate of
injury. This is a classic example of market failure.
One way to correct this market failure is to force the landownerconsumer to pay for the injuries due to latent defective conditions.
If forced to pay for the injuries due to latent property defects, the
landowner-consumer would reduce his bids for repair service. If the
landowner is aware of the possible defective conditions, he will
reduce his bids for service by an amount that reflects the cost of
compensating repairmen for their injuries. The efficient level of
consumption of repair services will result.
The efficient consumption level for repair services is the
quantity that provides the greatest net benefit to society from the
service. That level will be observed where the incremental benefit
from the last repair call is just equal to its incremental cost. The
incremental cost of the last repair call is simply the sum of the
repairman's reservation price and the cost of injury. Thus, the
efficient level of service will be observed when the incremental
benefit from service to the landowner is just equal to the sum of the
reservation price and the compensation transfer.
But if the
repairman is not aware of the risk of injury, he will not know to ask
to be compensated for it, and the service will appear to be cheaper
than it really is. Unless the landowner is required to pay for it, the
market level of repair service will be distorted away from (and
above) the efficient level. In contrast, if the landowner is required to
pay for the injury, then the service will not appear to be cheaper
than it really is. In this case the market will generate additional
service as long as the net benefit to the landowner, the value of
service less the cost of compensation, is at least as great as the
repairman's reservation price. The resulting market equilibrium is
where the net benefit to the landowner (from the last service call) is
equal to the repairman's reservation price, which is the efficient
service level.
In terms of Figure 1, note that when a landowner is not liable to
the repairman for injuries caused by defective conditions on his
property (because there are no defects), his bid for repair service will
reflect the value to him of the service (as shown in the demand
schedule D). However, when the landowner is held liable to the
repairman for injuries, he will deduct the cost of having to pay
compensation from his bid for the service. That results in a lower
bid, as reflected in the lower alternative demand schedule (D°).
When the landowner is required to pay compensation for injuries to
the repairman caused by latent defective conditions, the market
equilibrium will occur at the efficient level of consumption of repair
services (C in Figure 1). Landowner liability corrects the market
failure that would otherwise have resulted.
This analysis can be extended easily to the case in which the
invitee knows that there is some chance that he will confront a
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defective condition on the land. Suppose there are two types of
landowner: high-risk and low-risk. If both types occur with equal
frequency, the invitee will assume that the likelihood of an injury is
simply the average of the low-risk and high-risk cases. Even in this
case, the invitee will fail to adjust his service price to reflect the
specific risk generated by each landowner. A misallocation of
services similar to that described in the simpler case examined
earlier will be observed.
On the assumption that the landowner knows more about the
possible dangers on his property than does the invitee, which is
plausible, an adverse-selection process would result.2" Landowners
with relatively safe property would find the cost of repair service
expensive relative to the charge they would bear if they did their
own repair. As a result, the market for landowner-site repair
services would be disproportionately tilted toward landowners with
relatively defective property. Again, the result would be excessive
injuries until the repairmen adjusted their charges appropriately.
In the longer term of the most severe adverse-selection process, the
market for repair service would shrink substantially to the point of
collapse.
Viewed from this perspective, the traditional tort
classifications may have helped to support a large set of market
transactions.
B.

Linking to Law
In the analysis of the "repairman problem" above, I considered
the effect of holding the landowner liable for injuries to repairmen
caused by latent defective conditions on his property. To simplify
matters, I assumed that liability was strict. The analysis showed
that if the landowner had greater information than the visitor on
the possible defective conditions in the property, strict liability
corrected a market failure that would have otherwise resulted. In
the absence of strict liability, the cost of injuries to repairmen would
never be taken into account by the market, and the result would be
excessive injuries.
There are two immediate questions that arise in connecting this
analysis to the law. The first arises because the law does not hold
landowners strictly liable to invitees; they are liable on the basis of
negligence. Does this fact alter the analysis above? The second
20. Some legal rules, such as the rule governing foreseeability of contract
damages, can be understood as a mechanism for cutting short an adverseselection process that undermines the market. Tort rules can serve the same

function. See Mark F. Grady, Efficient Negligence, 87 GEo. L.J. 397, 404 (1998);
Hylton, Duty in Tort Law, supra note 8, at 1527. On the contract-law
applications of the adverse-selection theory, see generally Ian Ayres & Robert
Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts:An Economic Theory of Default
Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87 (1989); Lucian Ayre Bebchuk & Steven Shavell,
Information and the Scope of Liability for Breach of Contract: The Rule of
Hadley v. Baxendale, 7 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 284 (1991).
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issue connected to this analysis is suggested by the fact that the law
imposes a lower care requirement for the landowner in his dealings
with licensees. Is this consistent with the model?
The fact that the law imposes liability on the basis of
negligence, rather than strict liability, in the case of an invitee (such
as a repairman) does not alter the usefulness of the analysis above.
The reason is that the broad duty imposed on the landowner with
respect to invitees has the same effect and operates in a manner
equivalent to strict liability.
Recall that the law imposes a general duty of care in the case of
invitees. This means that in the context of latent defects, the
landowner has a duty to inspect for such defects and either to cure
them or to warn the invitee of their existence.
In many settings, a duty to inspect and cure (or warn), coupled
with negligence liability, will operate in effect as strict liability. One
key scenario was identified by Mark Grady in his analysis of res
ipsa loquitur doctrine.
Grady distinguished durable- and
nondurable-precaution settings. In durable-precaution settings, the
actor adopts a particular precaution and it remains effective for the
relevant period in which injuries might arise.22 In nondurable
precaution-settings, the actor must continually revisit the
23
Taking precaution once does not relieve the
precaution stage.
actor of a duty to take a similar precaution within the relevant time
period in which an injury might occur.
The classic example of a nondurable-precaution setting is
carefully watching the roads during a busy traffic period. If the
driver looks to both sides of the street in order to avoid hitting
another car or a pedestrian, that precautionary effort will be
effective only for the moment in which it occurs. In the following
second, the actor will have to renew the precautionary effort.
The problem with nondurable precaution is that it is bound to
generate failures at some point. No one is perfect 100% of the time.
Eventually, a moment of inadvertence will slip in, and if the actor is
unlucky, an injury will occur to someone as a result of the actor's
failure to take care.
There are not many obvious examples of nondurable precaution
in relation to property. Most precautionary efforts concerning
property are durable. But there may be cases in which the
landowner fails to exercise some nondurable precaution.
The
landowner's children may occasionally leave their toys in places that
might cause injury to a visitor to the land, for example. For the
landowner to find and cure the defect, he would have to monitor the
area in which children leave their toys continually. But the
21. Mark F. Grady, Res Ipsa Loquitur and Compliance Error, 142 U. PA. L.
REV. 887 (1994).

22. Id. at 903.
23. Id. at 908-09.
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landowner may forget to monitor one day. Indeed, this is bound to
happen at some point as the result of inadvertence. And when it
happens it will be difficult (probably impossible) for the landowner
to convince a court that he should not be found negligent because he
is careful 99.99% of the time. Holding the landowner liable on the
basis of negligence will operate effectively as strict liability in these
instances.
Another general case, especially important in this context, in
which negligence liability may operate as strict liability is when the
setting in which precaution is required is seldom experienced by the
actor. We may refer to this generally as a remote space within the
actor's precautionary domain.
Over remote spaces of the
precautionary domain the actor seldom experiences the need to take
precaution. He may not realize the need to take precaution at first.
In the property setting, it is relatively easy to think of remote
precautionary spaces. For example, there are areas of property that
some landowners seldom visit. A landowner that owns a onehundred-acre parcel may have portions of his real property through
which he seldom walks. A homeowner may have parts of his home
that he seldom visits. In such spaces, the landowner may not
readily perceive a need to inspect for dangers that a visitor might
encounter.
Reasonable precaution is, after all, a matter of
experience.24 If an actor seldom confronts a setting in which
precaution is desirable, he may not immediately perceive the
potential costs to others (or to himself) of failing to take care.
The attic is a good example of a remote precautionary space for
many homeowners. Most do not have a need to go up to the attic on
a regular basis. If a defective condition exists or develops in some
portion of the attic, most homeowners will probably not find out
about it or perceive a need to inspect for it. When a repairman visits
the attic, it may not dawn on the landowner, until it is too late, that
it would be desirable to inspect the attic for defective conditions.
And even if it dawns on the homeowner that such an inspection
would be desirable, he may have no idea how to conduct it.
These considerations imply that a broad negligence rule
covering remote precautionary spaces will operate in effect in the
same manner as strict liability. Negligence works best at inducing
efficient precaution when actors are trained by experience to
consider the potential costs of failing to take precaution. This
training from experience happens daily when actors take to the
roads in their cars. But in areas of activity in which actors seldom
engage, experience cannot train them to think immediately of the
costs and benefits of precaution. The negligence rule, over these
areas, is unlikely to induce efficient precaution. One could argue
that in the absence of experiential training, the actor's burden of
24.

OLIVER

WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE CONMON LAW 117-23

Little, Brown & Co. 1881).

(Boston,
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care is too great for him to take efficient precaution. But courts are
incapable of taking such considerations into account in the operation
of the negligence standard. In view of this problem, which is
analogous to Mark Grady's nondurable-precaution problem, the
negligence rule operates in effect as a strict-liability rule.
Durable precaution can interact with a remote precautionary
space. The landowner may have taken precaution to avoid injuries
to land visitors at one time. But as time passes, the precaution may
become ineffective. If the landowner seldom visits the area, the
property may develop a dangerously defective condition over time.
So the mere fact that the required precaution is durable does not
imply that the negligence rule will not have the same impact as a
strict-liability rule.
The landowner's duty with respect to latent defects that may
injure invitees is quite capable of inducing efficient precaution when
the type of precaution is durable and it occurs over a nonremote
precautionary space. However, these are the instances in which the
defective condition is unlikely to remain latent for long. If the
landowner frequently visits an area of his property, he will
He will probably
eventually discover the defective condition.
latent defective
to
it.
Thus,
visitor
gets
before
a
it
long
discover
conditions in property are most likely to be associated with remote
precautionary spaces and nondurable precautions. The duty to
invitees is described as a negligence rule, but because of the special
circumstances in which the duty will have a unique impact it is
indistinguishable in operation from a strict-liability rule.
The law imposes on the landowner a narrower duty with respect
to licensees. In this case, the landowner has to cure or warn of a
defective condition of which he is aware. He does not have a duty to
inspect for defective conditions.
This is understandable on the basis of traditional assumptionof-risk theory, applied in a categorical sense. There is a difference
between the risk knowledge of invitees and licensees in general.
Licensees, typically social guests, are likely to know more about the
landowner than would the typical invitee (the repairman). A friend
who visits the landowner's home is likely to know something of the
landowner's personal environment and habits, for example, whether
the landowner has children who leave their toys out in places that
would pose a risk to visitors. The licensee is likely to be aware of
dangers that might be posed by the landowner's hobbies or vocation,
for example, the case of a scientist who has constructed a laboratory
in his basement.
To be sure, there is no reason to believe that every licensee
knows more about the landowner's personal environment than every
potential invitee. Obviously, it is possible that a repairman might
know more about the condition of a landowner's property than some
licensees. But as a class, licensees are likely to know more than
invitees. Because licensees as a class are likely to have more
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information than do invitees on the condition of the landowner's
property, assumption-of-risk arguments are more applicable to
them.
To see the economic implications of assumption of risk, return
to Figure 1. If the visitor assumes the risk, then he is aware of the
potential injury cost that he faces on the landowner's property. If
we treat the licensee-landowner relationship as an exchange of
services in a market based on reciprocal altruism, the supply
schedule in Figure 1 can be viewed as reflecting the supply of
benefits offered by the licensee. The "price" charged by the licensee
is simply the quantity of reciprocal benefits expected by the licensee
for each benefit he confers on the landowner. If the licensee is
aware of the risk of injury, his "supply schedule" will reflect full
information (S'), which means that the licensee will demand a
higher price for every level of service that he offers to the
landowner. There is no excessive-injury problem in this case.
It may seem unusual to treat the relationship between a
landowner and a social guest as a market exchange, like that
between the landowner and the invitee. Social guests do not
demand to be paid for their services. But the simple notion reflected
in this treatment is that people are rational even in their dealings
with friends and social compatriots. They do not totally exclude
people whom they find difficult; they simply demand a greater
return from those relationships than from others.
There is another sense in which assumption-of-risk arguments
apply to the licensee more readily than to the invitee. The invitee
typically acts within a well-defined area of the land. Licensees, in
contrast, often assume the freedom to explore the land, even without
an explicit invitation to do so. An invitee (repairman) who is on the
land to fix the refrigerator in the kitchen on the first floor obviously
would exceed the scope of his invitation if he decided to explore the
bedrooms on the second floor. Licensees, however, often assume
that they are not confined to a particular part of the landowner's
property. The scope of the invitation is typically broader for the
licensee than the invitee.
A visitor to the land who strays beyond the immediate space of
the invitation is choosing to confront some risks. He knows that the
landowner has not invited him into the particular space in which he
strays. Given this, he knows that the landowner had no reason to
take precautions to safeguard him. Although he may not have
enough information to predict the particular risk that he faces, he is
aware that there is a range of risks that could materialize. Thus,
even if the licensee does not have preliminary information on the
risks that might materialize, which is more likely as he strays
further beyond the boundary of the invitation, his voluntary decision
to confront unknown risks is conduct that has traditionally been
treated as assumption of risk in the law. The actor could easily
avoid the risk by not straying outside of the boundary of the
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invitation.

Most instances in which the landowner will not be responsible
in damages to the licensee, because he was not aware of the
defective condition and could not easily have informed himself of it,
will involve remote precautionary spaces. There is no good reason in
these settings to think that the landowner is aware of the risk. The
licensee is unlikely to be aware either, but he has a choice over what
to do with his lack of information. His decision to forge ahead in
spite of his lack of information is a decision to act in the face of a
risk, and given that it is cheaper to be timid and fearful, the law
allocates the cost of that decision to the decision maker. This is
consistent with the goal of encouraging efficient precaution. By
allocating the cost of the injury to the licensee in these settings, the
law encourages the licensee to take care.
For both invitees and licensees, the assumption-of-risk rule
should apply when they stray beyond the scope of the invitation.
There is a difference though. The invitee has a tightly confined
space of invitation, and it is quite clear to everyone when he has
strayed beyond it. Moreover, the landowner's duty to the invitee
evaporates once he strays outside of the clear invitation boundary.
The licensee's space of invitation is less well defined. 25 There is a
core space of invitation for the licensee, and areas close to it are
probably part of that space too. A social guest invited to a dinner
party may reasonably consider himself invited to stray into the
kitchen. But at some point, depending on the circumstances, it will
be clear to everyone that the social guest has gone beyond the area
of the invitation.
One might argue that the landowner should still have the same
duty to licensees as to invitees because he is likely to know more
than the licensee about possible defective conditions. But what is
important in this analysis is the ability of the party to foresee
possible dangers. In this respect, the licensee and landowner may
not be far apart at all, especially given the information held by the
licensee. And the additional range of choice available to the
licensee, which is not available to the invitee, introduces a margin
along which the licensee can control the risk.
C.

Risk-Benefit Exchange
An alternative and closely related justification for the different
treatment of invitees and licensees can be grounded in the exchange
of benefit and risks among the parties. The legal distinction
between the two types of visitor, invitee and licensee, works to
provide a subsidy to (or, equivalently, to remove a tax from) the
landowner in his relationship with licensees. There is an economic
justification for this.
25. See, e.g., James, supra note 1, at 607.
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If the social guest is the stock example of a licensee, then it
appears immediately that there are two types. One is a long-term
repeat player, or relational licensee, and the other is a one-shot
visitor, or nonrelationallicensee. The relational licensees are those
The
involved in long-term relationships with the landowner.
nonrelational licensee is the social guest who happens to show up on
the landowner's property one day, perhaps to attend a party.
The foregoing discussion of assumption of risk applies to
relational licensees. Their relationship with the landowner is in
some respects similar to a market transaction; they earn the
benefits they get from the landowner through a quasi-market in
exchange conducted through a process of reciprocal altruism. The
assumption-of-risk theory, I argued above, often applies to them.
In addition to the assumption-of-risk theory, there is an
alternative rationale based on the exchange of risks between the
landowner and the relational licensee that justifies the common-law
rule governing the duty to licensees. If the relational licensee faces
a risk on the landowner's property one day, the landowner may face
a similar risk on the relational licensee's property the next day. In
the context of reciprocal harms, there is no economic basis for
adopting a strict-liability rule as between two interacting actors.26
The reason is simple: the chief purpose served by a strict-liability
rule is to control activity levels, that is, to reduce the overall
frequency of potentially injurious transactions.2 7 But in the case of
reciprocal harms, the costs generated by the activities of two
interacting actors will be the same whether liability is based on
negligence or strict liability. 6 If I impose a risk of a dollar per week
on you and you impose a risk of a dollar per week on me, then a
strict-liability rule imposed on the two of us is equivalent to having
us trade a dollar (you give me a dollar; I give you a dollar) every
week.
Because the expected injuries from defective property conditions
are roughly the same between the landowner and the relational
licensee, the risks between them are reciprocal, and no purpose
would be served by adopting a rule of strict liability. This provides
an alternative justification to the assumption-of-risk theory, based
on the exchange of risks, for the legal distinction between invitees
and licensees. Of course, in some respects this justification is quite
similar to the assumption-of-risk argument because it is based on an
equivalence of risk impositions with which the parties are assumed
to be familiar.
Now consider the other type of licensee, the nonrelational
26. Hylton, Duty in Tort Law, supra note 8, at 1507.
27. Steven Shavell, Strict Liability Versus Negligence, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 1
(1980).
28. Keith N. Hylton, A Positive Theory of Strict Liability, 4 REV. L. & ECON.
153 (2008).
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licensee. The law governing the landowner's duties is defensible on
economic grounds in the context of these one-shot visitors too.
There is a simple story that illustrates the intuition for the
justification in the case of nonrelational licensees. Suppose you buy
a newspaper, read it, and then leave it on a park bench. Another
person comes along later, finds the newspaper and gains just as
much information from it as you did. The benefits received by the
second reader are free spillover benefits flowing from your decision
to buy a newspaper. In economic terms, this occurs because
information is a public good that, once supplied, can be consumed by
Because information is a public good, it tends to be
many.
undersupplied to the market. The market generates too few
newspapers, or too little information, relative to the economically
efficient quantity. Ideally, some subsidy would be provided in the
newspaper market to correct this market failure. Although the
government does not provide a subsidy to newspapers, the market
itself has provided one mechanism for addressing the informational
market failure: advertising. Firms that purchase advertising do so
with a view toward reaching all of the possible viewers of each
newspaper, whether purchasers or not.
An analogous market failure happens in the setting of land
visitors, especially licensees. The nonrelational licensees are like
the second newspaper reader in the example above. They show up
and get their free spillover benefits without ever having to invest in
any relationship with the landowner.
Just like the case of newspapers and information, the supply of
benefits offered by landowners will tend to be less than the socially
efficient level, and for the same reason. A substantial number of
licensees free ride off the relationship investments of others, like the
second readers of the purchased newspapers. The misallocation
would be exacerbated if the landowner were held strictly liable to all
licensees for injuries caused by latent defects in his property. The
law effectively avoids this outcome by applying a limited negligence
rule to the landowner in his relationship with the licensee.
Alternatively, one could say that the law provides an implicit
subsidy for landowners for the production of a public good.
To take this argument seriously one has to assume that social
events serve an important function in society. They clearly do.
Social events serve as the sites for collective decisions, such as
political meetings, or for social bonding. The landowner who
facilitates these events provides a key input in the supply of
important social services. The common law, in other settings, has
shown a willingness to reduce liability in order to subsidize public
goods, which is evident in the common-law treatment of charitable
services, rescue attempts, and liability for hazardous activities
29. See McDonald v. Mass. Gen. Hosp., 120 Mass. 432 (1876) (relying on
Holliday v. St. Leonard, Shoreditch Vestry (1861) 142 Eng. Rep. 769 (C.P.), in
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that provide public benefits." The law governing duties to licensees
may reflect, at least in part, the same interest.
D.

Duty to Trespassers
I have focused on the distinction between invitees and licensees
because that is the area of most controversy in the law. Relatively
few courts have abolished the distinction between trespassers and
licensees.
The cheapest-cost-avoider rationale provided so far continues to
apply to some extent in the case of trespassers. In many settings, it
is cheaper for trespassers to refrain from trespassing than it is for
the landowner to anticipate and eliminate risks to them.
However, the rule that the landowner owes no duty to
trespassers has a more general and different theoretical basis than
that for the distinction between invitees and licensees. The absence
of a duty on the part of the landowner toward the trespasser, in the
common law, can
as the complementary rule to
S 32 be understood
trespass doctrine. Trespass law permits the landowner to exclude
all others for any reason. The best economic case is grounded in the
property-rule framework of Calabresi and Melamed 3 The right to
exclude and to enjoin invasions forces would-be invaders to bargain
for rights of access. The rules effectively protect the subjective
valuations that landowners attach to property.3
The no-duty-to-trespassers rule is implied by trespass doctrine
and its functional basis. A duty of care toward trespassers would
result in expropriations of subjective valuation from landowners.
One reason a landowner may be willing to invest in land for a
particular purpose is the knowledge that he does not have to alter
the use of his property to accommodate the needs of a potential
making Massachusetts the first state to adopt charitable immunity, holding a
charity hospital immune from liability); W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND
KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS §133, at 1069 (5th ed. 1984); Note, The Quality
of Mercy: 'CharitableTorts' and Their ContinuingImmunity, 100 HARV. L. REV.
1382 (1987). Now virtually all states have rejected the complete charityimmunity doctrine. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 895E (1979) ("One
engaged in a charitable, educational, religious, or benevolent enterprise or
activity is not for that reason immune from tort liability.").
30. For discussion of tort doctrine governing rescue attempts, see Hylton,
Duty in Tort Law, supra note 8, at 1514-16, noting that the law subsidizes
rescue by holding the rescuer responsible for contributory negligence only if he
has acted rashly or recklessly.
31. One example of a hazardous activity that provides public benefits is
operating a zoo. Instead of applying strict liability under the Rylands doctrine,
many courts have applied the negligence rule to zoos. See, e.g., Guzzi v. N.Y.
Zoological Soc'y, 182 N.Y.S. 257 (App. Div. 1920), affd, 233 N.Y. 511 (1922);
City of Denver v. Kennedy, 476 P.2d 762 (Colo. Ct. App. 1970).
32.

Hylton, Duty in Tort Law, supra note 8, at 1510-12.

33. Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 14.
34. Keith N. Hylton, PropertyRules and Liability Rules, Once Again, 2 REV.
L. & ECON. 137 (2006).
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invader. And since potential invaders can come in a wide variety of
forms and from all sorts of directions, the investments that would be
required by the landowner could be enormous.

My argument
categories created
the categories are
suggested in the

III. APPLICATION OF THEORY
provides an economic justification for the general
by the common law. In contrast to the view that
simply a relic of feudalism's class hierarchies, as
landmark Rowland v. Christian opinion, 5 the

categories appear to serve specific functions.
I set out to justify broad categories, not specific case outcomes.
The cases that make their way to appellate courts are often difficult
and call into question or suggest a conflict between more than one of
the functions identified in this Article. The best way to examine
those cases is on the basis of the specific functions and purposes of
the landowner-duty rules.
A good example of one of the difficult cases is Burrell v. Meads.36
The homeowner and a friend decided to install a ceiling in the
homeowner's garage. The friend climbed up to the rafters and
walked across a surface that appeared to be plywood but was not.
The surface gave way and the friend fell to the garage floor,
suffering severe injuries. 7
The court rejected the traditional
category-based law, which would have classified the friend as a
licensee, and decided to categorize the friend as an invitee.3"
Burrell displays a conflict between the rigid-categorization
approach and the functions identified for the common-law
classifications. Social guests are classified as licensees because they
often have some basis on which to predict the risks they might face
on the landowner's property, because of the nature of the riskbenefit exchange, and because of the voluntary choice they make to
confront a specific risk. But note that in Burrell, there is no reason
to believe that the landowner's friend had any basis on which to
predict the condition of a surface supported by beams near the roof
of the garage. Unlike the social guest who might have some
information on the landowner's habits or environment (for example,
children leaving toys on the ground), the space near the garage
ceiling is an area whose condition probably would not be related in
any predictable way to the landowner's lifestyle. The assumption-ofrisk justification for the law governing the licensee category is not
applicable in Burrell. Moreover, the landowner's friend, unlike the
typical licensee who encounters a danger in a remote area of the
landowner's property, did not exercise a choice to confront that risk
for his own utility, but confronted it, in the same manner as does the
35.
36.
37.
38.

See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
Burrel v. Meads, 569 N.E.2d 637 (Ind. 1991).
Id. at 638-39.
Id. at 643.
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typical invitee, as part of an obligation to the landowner.
The risk-benefit-exchange theory suggests that landowners
have a less demanding duty to licensees in part to compensate the
landowner for the public goods that he provides to the class of
licensees. But the friend in Burrell is not in any sense the potential
recipient of any public good produced by the landowner. The friend
in Burrell is there to do a job that is ordinarily done by a contracted
handyman.
These arguments suggest that the reasons for distinguishing
the licensee category from the invitee category do not apply to the
friend in Burrell, even though he is a social guest. Following
function rather than category, the friend should be treated as if he
were an invitee. The mere fact that he is a social guest should not
determine the outcome in Burrell. But this approach, which
emphasizes function rather than category, does not imply that
courts should necessarily abolish the distinction between invitee and
licensee as general categories. The categories can be treated much
more flexibly in response to underlying theoretical rationales.
My approach may seem to undermine the certainty created by
having rigid classifications. But the certainty created by the
categories is illusory when one approaches the boundaries and
encounters cases that are difficult to reconcile with any sense of the
purpose of the common-law classifications. The approach observed
in some courts recently has been to abolish the classifications when
encountering these cases. The preferable approach is to look more
seriously into the possible incentive-based justifications for the
categories and to use the functions implied by the classifications to
resolve disputes at the boundary. For cases well within the
boundaries of the categories, no additional uncertainty would be
created by this approach.
CONCLUSION

I have offered a positive theory of the traditional land-visitor
classifications in the common law of torts. Their most basic function
is to allocate liability for injuries from defective conditions in
property to the party who is most likely to be aware of the risk (or
the possibility of risk) or to take action to avoid the potential risk.
The traditional law provides reasonable regulations governing the
scale of injury-causing activities and the level of precaution over
injury-causing decisions.
As with any positive theory of legal doctrine, this one invites a
more careful empirical examination. Perhaps the conditions that
made the rules desirable from a regulatory perspective in the past
no longer exist today. Whether the theory of this Article stands or
falls in the long run, its key message is that it is important to
attempt to understand the function or functions of common-law
doctrines. At the least, courts and legal scholars should attempt to
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